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Low-technology unlicensed micro-enterprises known as "informal" firms are a significant
source of pollution in developing countries that are virtually impossible to regulate in the
conventional manner.  This paper describes an example of an innovative and promising approach
to the problem:  the Ciudad Juárez Brickmakers' Project, a private-sector-led initiative aimed at
abating highly polluting emissions from Ciudad Juárez, Mexico's approximately 300 informal
brick kilns.  We draw four lessons from the Project's history.  First, private-sector-led initiatives
can work -- indeed they may be more effective than public sector initiatives -- but they require
strong public sector support.  Second, necessary conditions for effective environmental
management in the informal sector include enlisting the cooperation of  local organizations,
relying upon peer monitoring, and offsetting compliance costs.  Ineffective strategies include
promoting too-advanced technologies and intervening in informal markets.  Third, pollution
control strategies that provide the greatest environmental benefits may be less appropriate than
low-cost intermediate strategies.  Finally, in volatile developing economies, market-based
environmental initiatives in the informal sector are bound to be fragile.
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POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR:
THE CIUDAD JUÁREZ BRICKMAKERS' PROJECT
Allen Blackman and Geoffrey J. Bannister1
1.   INTRODUCTION
In developing countries, population growth, rural-urban migration, and government
efforts to tax and regulate have spurred the rapid expansion of an informal sector comprised of
low-technology micro-enterprises which operate outside the purview of the state.  Although
historically seen as little more than a collection of street merchants, today the informal sector is
increasingly recognized as a leading contributor to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a
hotbed of innovation and entrepreneurship.2  This emerging view is borne out by recent
research.  According to Gustav Ranis and Frances Stewart, the informal sector accounts for
over half of non-agricultural employment in both Latin America and Africa.3  Estimates of its
contribution to GDP in various countries range from twenty to forty percent.4
But while many policymakers and academics now recognize that the growth of the
informal sector has generated important economic benefits, to date they have almost
completely ignored the environmental impacts.  This oversight may have to do with the
persistence of the fiction that the informal sector is comprised only of environmentally benign
retail and service oriented activities.  Actually, it includes many pollution intensive activities
such as tanning, brick and tile making, automotive repair, wood finishing, metalworking,
electroplating, and small-scale mining.5  Given the sheer number of such firms in developing
                                               
1 The authors are, respectively: Fellow, Resources for the Future (corresponding author, phone 202-328-5073,
fax 202-939-3460, email:  blackman@rff.org); and Assistant Professor, Anderson Schools of Management,
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.
2 Nathaniel C. Nash, Informal Latin Economy Saves the Day, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1992, at L37, L41.  See also
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (1989).  Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) is a measure of the total value of goods and services a country produces in a given year.
3 GUSTAV RANIS & FRANCIS  STEWART, V-GOODS AND THE ROLE OF THE URBAN INFORMAL SECTOR IN
DEVELOPMENT 18-20, (Yale Univ. Economic Growth Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 724, 1994).
4 DAN BILLER & JUAN DAVID QUINTERO, , POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS INFORMAL SECTOR CONTAMINATION IN
URBAN LATIN AMERICA: THE CASE OF LEATHER TANNERIES IN BOGOTA, COLOMBIA 3 (The World Bank, Latin
Am. Technical Dep't, Envtl. Div., Dissemination Note No. 14, 1995).
5 For example, in Mexico, 38 percent of informal firms are classified as industrial.  U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 1, THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN MEXICO 21a, (1992).Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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countries, the aggregate environmental impacts are likely to be significant.  The limited literature
which exists supports this view.6  According to Ahmed Hamza,
While in people's minds, industrial pollution is mainly contributed by large
primary and conversion industries, . . . the bulk of pollution in urban areas is the
result of dispersed medium/small-size industries which in many regions
comprise the major part of manufacturing activities.7
In Mexico, small-scale traditional brick kilns are a notorious informal sector source of
urban air pollution.  According to one estimate, there are approximately 20,000 traditional
brick kilns in the country.8  Many large cities support several hundred kilns.  These kilns are
fired with a variety of cheap highly polluting fuels including plastic refuse, used tires, manure,
wood scrap, and used motor oil.9  In many cities, traditional kilns are a leading source of air
pollution.10  Even where they are not, the kilns constitute a serious local health hazard to the
residents of the impoverished neighborhoods that usually abut brickyards, as well as to
brickmakers themselves.11
The most common regulatory strategy has been to ban the use of dirty fuels.  However,
many of these efforts have failed.  For example, efforts to promote cleaner fuels such as propane
and creosote in Saltillo, Coahuila, Torreon, Coahuila, and Zacatecas, Zacatecas have met with
limited success.12
                                               
6 See e.g.,. BILLER & QUINTERO, supra note 5; DAN BILLER, INFORMAL GOLD MINING AND MERCURY
POLLUTION IN BRAZIL (The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1304, 1994); AHMED Hamza,
United Nations Center for Human Settlements Urban Management Program, Impacts of Industrial and Small-
scale Manufacturing Wastes on Urban Environment in Developing Countries 6 (1991); Environmental
management of small and medium size industries, Industry and Environment, April/May/June 1987, at 2
(1987).
7 Hamza, supra note 6.
8 Anders T. Johnson et al., Successful Modernization of an Ancient Industry: The Brickmakers of Cd. Juárez,
Mexico 2 (April 25, 1994).
9 See, e.g., Allen Blackman & Geoffrey J. Bannister, Traditional Brickmaking in Northern Mexico:  The
Problem of Pollution Control in an Informal Industry (1997) presented at the 1997 meeting of the Assoc. of
Borderland Scholars, Albuquerque, N.M.) [hereinafter Blackman & Bannister (1997)].
10 See, e.g., Blackman & Bannister (1997), supra note 9.
11 Although there is plentiful anecdotal evidence that smoke inhalation is harmful, there is scant information
on the health risks borne by brickmakers in particular. See, e.g., the studies cited in DAVID BRADLEY ET AL., A
REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH IMPACTS IN DEVELOPING CITIES (The World Bank, Urban Management
Program, Discussion Paper No. 6, 1992).  An exception is a cursory study of the pulmonary function of
brickmakers in Saltillo, Couhila. Informe de Resultados del Estudio Pulmonar Realizado a Persones que
Laboran y Viven cerca del las Ladrilleras (July 17, 1996).  The study found that of fifty-five subjects tested,
only twenty-nine presented with "normal" pulmonary functions.
12 For a description of these efforts see Blackman & Bannister (1997), supra note 9.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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In general, controlling pollution created by informal firms is especially difficult for four
reasons.  First, by definition, informal firms have few preexisting ties to the state.  Second,
such firms are difficult to monitor since they are small, numerous, and geographically
dispersed.  Third, intensely competitive informal firms are under considerable pressure to cut
costs regardless of the environmental impacts.  And finally, informal firms sustain the poorest
of the poor.  As a consequence, they may appear to both regulators and the public as less
appropriate targets for regulation than larger, wealthier firms.  Given these constraints, the
application of conventional command and control regulation is bound to be problematic if not
completely impractical.13  Hence, pollution control in the informal sector will require
innovative approaches.
The Ciudad Juárez Brickmakers' Project (hereafter, "the Project") which has worked to
abate highly polluting emissions from the city's approximately 300 traditional brick kilns since
1990, is an example of an innovative approach.  In the three years between 1991 and 1994, it
was successful in persuading at least half of Ciudad Juárez's brickmakers to fire their kilns with
clean-burning propane.
The Project is innovative for several reasons.  First, it is not headed by a regulatory
authority but by a non-governmental organization, The Mexican Federation of Private Health
and Community Development Associations(FEMAP).14  In addition, it has enlisted the
participation of a diverse set of private- and public-sector stakeholders.  And finally, its leaders
have worked to establish a cooperative instead of an adversarial relationship with brickmakers,
creating incentives for voluntary compliance as well as penalties for non-compliance.
This paper reviews the history of the Brickmakers' Project in order to distill lessons
about pollution control in the informal sector.  It draws upon a variety of sources including an
extensive survey administered to ninety-five brickmakers in July of 1995, interviews with
project participants, and primary and secondary written sources.  The next section of this paper
provides background on air pollution in El Paso-Ciudad Juárez and on traditional brickmaking.
The third section details the history of the Brickmakers' Project.  The concluding section
distills lessons from this history.
                                               
13 Command and control regulation, the dominant approach to pollution control in virtually every country in the
world, requires an environmental authority to promulgate and enforce regulations governing the abatement
technologies firms use and/or the amount of abatement they undertake.  For a review of the literature on
environmental regulation see Maureen Cropper & Wallace Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. OF
ECON. LITERATURE 675, 740 (1992).
14 Founded in Ciudad Juárez in 1973, FEMAP administers health care and microenterprise development
projects in twenty-five Mexican states. See, INSTITUTO DE ECOTECHNOLOGIA, WHY IS THIS NEWS? (undated);
FEMAP, general brochure (undated).Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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2.   BACKGROUND
El Paso-Ciudad Juárez Air Quality
Air quality in the sister cites of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, is the
worst on the United States-Mexican border and among the worst in North America.15  In
1995, the city of El Paso was classified by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
as a "moderate" nonattainment area for both carbon monoxide and particulate matter, and El
Paso county was classified as a "serious" non-attainment area for ozone.16
Poor air quality in the sister cities stems from rapid industrialization and population
growth over the last several decades and from the fact that the cities are located in a high
desert valley that fosters temperature inversions.17  The leading sources of air pollution in the
region are, in order of magnitude:  vehicle emissions, dust from unpaved roads, industrial
pollution, and open air fires.18  Not surprisingly, the locations of these sources reflect the
relative levels of development on each side of the border.  Open air fires used in brickmaking
and residential heating, unpaved roads, cement plants, and a relatively old vehicular fleet in
Ciudad Juárez are major sources of particulate matter and carbon monoxide.  North of the
border, the ASARCO copper smelter and the Chevron oil refinery are major sources of sulfur
oxides, nitrogen oxides, and heavy metals.19
Principally fired with scrap wood and sawdust that is often impregnated with toxic
resins, laminates and varnishes, Ciudad Juárez's approximately 300 small-scale brick kilns are
frequently cited as the third or fourth leading contributor to air pollution in both Ciudad Juárez
and El Paso.20  Although brick kilns are primarily associated with carbon monoxide and
particulate emissions, depending on the fuels used, they may also emit volatile organic
                                               
15 Francisco Nuñez et al., Solving Air Pollution Problems in Paso del Norte 1 (October 1994).
16 Telephone Interview with Miguel Parra, Air Investigator, TNRCC (Mar. 21, 1996).
17 From 1980 to 1990, the population of Ciudad Juárez grew at an average annual rate of 3.47 percent while
that of Mexico as a whole grew at 1.92 percent.  During the same time period, the population of El Paso grew
at an average annual rate of 2.79 percent while that of the United States grew at an average annual rate of 1.26
percent. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTRY AND CITY DATA BOOK (1994); INSTITUTO
NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA, GEOGRAFIA E INFORMATICA, ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS: RESUMEN GENERAL: XI
CENSO GENERAL DE POBLACION Y VIVIENDA, 1990 (1992).
18 TOM BARRY, THE CHALLENGE OF CROSS-BORDER ENVIRONMENTALISM 38-39 (1994).
19 C. Richard Bath and Victoria Rodriquez, Comparative Binational Air Pollution Policy in El Paso, TX and
Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, 6 BORDERLANDS 171 (1983).
20 See e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 8, and Martha Mendoza, LANL Helping Mexico clean Up Border Smog,
Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 5, 1995, at. C1, C3. Though widely used, this statistic is undocumented.  According
to the TNRCC, no emissions inventory has ever been performed for Ciudad Juárez. Telephone Interview with
Archibald Clouse, Interim Region Manager, TNRCC (Jan. 6, 1996).Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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compounds, nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, heavy metals, and carbon dioxide, the most
important greenhouse gas.21
Traditional Brickmaking in Ciudad Juárez
The problem of emissions from traditional kilns in Ciudad Juárez has been greatly
exacerbated by the city's growth.  Ciudad Juárez' approximately 300 brick kilns are clustered in
eight poor colonias located throughout the city:  Anapra, División del Norte, Francisco Villa,
Fronteriza Baja, Kilómetro 20, México 68, Satellite, and Senecu 2.22  When brickmakers squatted
in these colonias twenty-five or thirty years ago, all were situated on the outskirts of the city.
Today, however, because of urban sprawl, many are located in residential neighborhoods.  As a
result, brick kilns have sparked considerable controversy; they were the most frequent subject of
complaints to the Ciudad Juárez municipal environmental authority in 1994.23
Despite growing pressure to act on complaints about traditional kilns, a number of
considerations make it politically difficult to require brickmakers to bear the full costs of pollution
control.  First, brick making is a significant source of employment.  According to FEMAP, the non-
governmental organization that leads the Brickmakers' Project, brickmaking in Ciudad Juárez
provides over 2,000 jobs directly and 150 jobs indirectly in transportation and wholesaling.24
Second, brickmaking is an extremely small-scale, low-technology activity and, as a
result, most brickmakers are impoverished.  On average, each kiln employs six workers who
perform all tasks by hand.25  Studies have put the brickmakers' monthly profit when burning
traditional fuels at between 450-900 pesos ($60-$120 at an exchange rate of 7.5 pesos to the
dollar).26  This sum compares to the monthly minimum wage in the north of Mexico of about
480 pesos ($64).27  Not surprisingly, socioeconomic conditions are poor.  Most brickmakers
live next to their kilns in rudimentary houses with no drainage or running water.  On average,
kiln owners have three years of schooling, and approximately a quarter are illiterate.  Most
                                               
21 Johnson et al., supra note 8, at 3. The authors report that tests of emissions from traditional brick kilns
burning five different fuels -- sawdust, contaminated sawdust, used motor oil, propane (old burner), and
propane (new burner) -- showed the two "least desirable" fuels to be used motor oil and contaminated sawdust.
Kilns burning these fuels emitted relatively high levels of volatile organic compounds and carbon monoxide.
22 Dirección Municipal de Ecologia, Juárez Kiln Distribution (January 1995).
23 Brick kilns were the subject of one quarter of all complaints. Dirección Municipal de Ecologia, Complaints
According to their Origin, (January 1995).
24 FEMAP, Report for December 1992 - January 1994 at 5 (1994).
25 FEMAP, Summary of Brick Kiln Census (May 1991). Traditional brickmaking involves four tasks: mixing
earth and clay, molding the mixture into bricks, drying the bricks in the sun, and firing them in a primitive
adobe kiln.
26 FEMAP, supra note 25. It is difficult to calculate the profit from informal activities precisely owing to poor
record keeping and the use of family labor.
27 BANCO DE MEXICO, THE MEXICAN ECONOMY 1995 (1996).  Minimum wage figures are for April - Sept.
1995 at 18.3 pesos per day.  The monthly figure is calculated assuming 26 days of work per month.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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brickmakers are over forty years of age, quite old in comparison to the population as a whole
(Table 1).28
Table 1.  Summary Statistics
Socio-economic status
Avg. age 47
Avg. years formal education 3
Live within 100M kiln 53 %
LPG use
Adopted LPG 62 %
Access to free LPG equip. (LPG users) 100 %
Modified kiln (LPG users) 54 %
Given inducements to adopt (LPG users) 12 %
Assistance
Believe technical assistance is available 10 %
Received technical assistance 1 %
Believe financial assistance is available 25 %
Received financial assistance 5 %
Formal regulation
Aware of government regulations 77 %
Observed enforcement 75 %
Local organizations
Member of local organization 59 %
Member of PRI affiliate 40 %
Member of CDP 19 %
Local organization influenced fuel choice 52 %
Neighbors influenced fuel choice 38 %
Health
Aware of health problems 10 %
Believe use of LPG "healthier" than debris 11 %
Source:  authors' survey, n = 95
Finally, abating kiln emission in Cd Juárez is politically sensitive because the brickmakers
are well-organized.29  Fifty-nine percent of the brickmakers surveyed belonged to a local
organization.  There are two rival political factions among the brickmakers.  The first faction is
                                               
28 ALLEN BLACKMAN & GEOFFREY J. BANNISTER, Community Pressure and Clean Technology in the Informal
Sector: An Econometric Analysis of the Adoption of Propane by Traditional Mexican Brickmakers, JOURNAL
OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 35 (1998); and FEMAP, supra note 25.
29 BLACKMAN & BANNISTER, supra note 28. FEMAP, supra note 25.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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comprised of organizations affiliated with the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the
dominant national political party.  These include the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos
(CTM) and the Frente Nacional de Organizaciones Ciudadanas (FNOC).  Many of the
brickmakers in these organizations also belong to the Sindicato de Ladrilleros y Trabajadores de
la Cal, the PRI affiliated Brickmakers' Union.  The PRI affiliates tend to represent the relatively
affluent brickmakers.  Their leaders act as intermediaries between the brickmakers, the city
government, and federal agencies.  Because of their ties to the political establishment, (whether
controlled by the PRI or its principal opposition party, the Partido Acción Nacional or PAN),
these organizations have been successful in extracting concessions from the municipal
government.30  The PRI affiliates were one of the main instruments used by the city government
(at that time PAN) and FEMAP to persuade brickmakers to adopt propane.31
The poorest colonias are dominated by a rival organization, the Comite de Defensa
Popular (CDP) which is linked to the national Partido del Trabajo (PT).32  Having been
formed to fight the city government's attempts to evict squatters, the CDP has traditionally
opposed the political establishment and has resisted attempts to regulate brickmaking.  In
particular, it has resisted efforts to convince brickmakers to use cleaner fuels.  Forty percent of
the brickmakers in our sample belonged to a PRI affiliate, nineteen percent to the CDP, and the
remaining forty-one percent were independent.
3.   HISTORY  OF  THE  BRICKMAKERS'  PROJECT
The Birth of the Brickmakers' Project
At every stage, the Ciudad Juárez Brickmakers' Project has been shaped by national and
international political trends as well as by local concerns and efforts.  On the level of national
politics, the Project was, broadly speaking, spawned by the Mexican Federal government's
new-found emphasis on environmental protection in the late 1980s.  Heralded by the
emergence of the environment as an important issue in the 1988 Federal elections and by the
passage of a new comprehensive Federal Ecology Law that same year, this new
environmentalism was by no means mere rhetoric.33  In just three years between 1988 and
1991, federal expenditures on the environment by the Mexican government increased from
                                               
30 For example, in responding to the authors' survey, the leader of one PRI affiliate mentioned that members of
his union received subsidies on water bills as well as permits for dredging a local canal for clay. ALLEN
BLACKMAN & GEOFFREY J. BANNISTER, JUÁREZ BRICK KILN QUESTIONNAIRE (Version 4.1 1995) (survey data on
file with the authors).
31 PRI affiliates dominate certain brickmaking colonias such as Satelite, have a sizable proportion of others
such as México 68, and are completely absent from some of the poorest colonias such as Anapra.
32 BLACKMAN & BANNISTER, supra note 28; Ciudad Juárez Survey Summary Statistics. FEMAP, supra note 25.
33 Steven Mumme, Clearing the Air: Environmental Reform in Mexico, ENV'T, Dec. 1991, at 6, 9-11.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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$95 million to $1.8 billion, the equivalent of 0.7 percent of Mexico's GDP.34  The growing
importance of environmental issues put pressure on the Ciudad Juárez municipal government
to give higher priority to environmental protection.35
On the local level, an important antecedent to the Brickmakers' Project was a widening
recognition during the 1980s that traditional brick kilns in Ciudad Juárez are an important
source of air pollution.  An activist Citizens' Environmental Advisory Committee to the El
Paso City Council played a pivotal role in creating this awareness.36
Motivated by these national and local events, in 1989 the Ciudad Juárez environmental
authority, the Municipal Council for Ecology, undertook a campaign to convince brickmakers
to substitute clean-burning propane for dirty traditional fuels.37  To our knowledge, this was
the first concerted effort to abate emissions from brick kilns in Ciudad Juárez.
The Municipal Council's leadership of the propane initiative was short-lived, however.
In 1990, FEMAP, a private non-profit organization based in Ciudad Juárez, took charge.
According to Project leaders, the city transferred control of the propane initiative to FEMAP
because of FEMAP's expertise in grass roots organizing in poor colonias, including several
brickmaking colonias in Ciudad Juárez.38
As a non-profit service organization, FEMAP grafted social and economic objectives
onto the strictly environmental goals pursued by the Municipal Council for Ecology.  A
FEMAP report on the Brickmakers' Project lists two rather broad objectives:
(1) To help reduce environmental pollution by encouraging the use of less polluting
energy sources and implementation of technology to insure complete combustion.
                                               
34 Nicolas Kublicki, The Greening of Free Trade, NAFTA, Mexican Environmental Law, and Debt Exchanges
for Mexican Environment Infrastructure Development, 19 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 59, 93
(1994).
35 Interview with Enrique Suárez, Executive Director, FEMAP, in Juárez, Mexico (Dec. 11, 1995).
36 The eight member Citizen's Environmental Advisory Committee was created by El Paso Mayor Suzie Azar
in the mid 1980's to advise member of the city council on environmental matters. Telephone Interview with
Anne Allen, Citizens' Environmental Advisory Committee to the El Paso, Tex. City Council (Jan. 10, 1996).
This committee helped to popularize the statistic that traditional brick kilns are the third or fourth leading
source of air pollution in El Paso-Ciudad Juárez. Telephone Interview with Carlos Rincon, Project Director,
Environmental Defense Fund (Dec. 5, 1995). Dr. Rene Franco Barreno, then director of the Ciudad Juárez
Municipal Council of Ecology and the founder of the propane initiative, was a frequent participant in the
Citizens' Environmental Advisory Committee to the El Paso, Tex. City Council. Telephone Interview with
Carlos Rincon, Project Director, Environmental Defense Fund (Jan. 31, 1996).
37 Interview with Enrique Suárez, Executive Director, FEMAP, in Cd. Juárez, Chihuahua, Mex. (Feb. 1,
1996); Interview with Rene Franco Barreno, former President of Ciudad Juárez Municipal Council of Ecology,
in Reno, Nevada (Apr. 19,1996).
38 Interview with Enrique Suárez, supra note 37. Other factors may have played a role as well, including the
expectation that the propane initiative would be able to secure funding from Solidarity Enterprises, a federal
microenterprise development program.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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(2) To help improve standards of well-being and quality of life for brickmaking
families and others like them, by preserving production capacity, modernizing their
small enterprises, improving productivity and product quality, and increasing income
through avoidance of intermediaries.39
This paper will focus on the Project's efforts to achieve its environmental objectives.  However,
as the discussion below will illustrate, these efforts were, to some degree, shaped by the
Project's concurrent social objectives.
The Role of NAFTA and Mexican Politics
Although the Brickmakers' Project did not succeed in converting more than thirty percent
of Juárez's brickmakers to propane until the end of 1993, by the end of 1991 it had already begun
to generate an extraordinary amount of publicity, institutional participation, and some outside
funding.40  Two national and international events which focused unprecedented attention on
border environmental issues were largely responsible:  the 1991 debate over the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 1991 Mexican midterm Federal elections.
Both the Bush and Salinas administrations committed enormous political capital to the
Free Trade Agreement yet, to the surprise of both administrations, during the spring 1991
debate in the United States congress over granting the Bush administration 'fast track' authority
to negotiate the treaty, environmentalists organized an angry and vociferous opposition
arguing that a free trade agreement would spur still more rapid and uncontrolled development
along the border.41  The NAFTA negotiators efforts to allay these concerns by developing the
Integrated Environmental Plan for the United States-Mexican Border fell flat and the debate
about the border environment continued unabated throughout the NAFTA negotiations and the
subsequent congressional battle over ratification.42
                                               
39 FEMAP, supra note 24, at 2.
40 As late as December 1992, no more than fifteen percent of the brickmakers in five principal brickmaking
colonias in Ciudad Juárez -- some fifty to sixty brickmakers -- were using propane. FEMAP, supra note 24,
at 21.
41 On the NAFTA debate see Jan Gilbreath & John Benjamin Tonra, The Environment: Unwelcome Guest at
the Free Trade Party, in THE NAFTA DEBATE: GRAPPLING WITH UNCONVENTIONAL TRADE ISSUES (M. Delal
Baer & Sidney Weintraub eds. 1994).
42 Produced jointly by the USEPA and its Mexican counterpart SEDUE, the Integrated Environmental Plan (IEP)
for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area purported to be a master plan for dealing with border environmental problems.
US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN [IEP] FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S.
BORDER AREA:  FIRST STAGE 1992-1994 (1992). The IEP attracted intense criticism for a lack of funding, limited
opportunities for public participation, and general vagueness. See, e.g., JAN GILBREATH RICH, PLANNING THE
BORDER'S FUTURE: THE MEXICAN-U.S. INTEGRATED BORDER ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN, (US-Mex. Policy Studies
Program, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Tex. at Austin Occasional Paper No. 1, 1992).Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
10
The 1991 Mexican midterm Federal election also focused attention on border
environmental issues.  Pre-election polls indicated that sixty percent of Mexicans considered
the environment to be a high priority.43
The upshot of these events was that by the fall of 1991, for the first time ever, the
border environment became an important issue for both the United States and Mexican Federal
governments.  Both countries stepped up regulatory enforcement along the border and initiated
a number of environmental projects and programs.44  Funding to deal with long neglected
border environmental issues which had previously been chronically scarce, suddenly became
available.45
The NAFTA debate combined with the genuine, if new-found, emphasis on the
environment in Mexico created a special opportunity for FEMAP.  The Brickmakers' Project
was tailor-made to suit the political purposes of the Salinas administration.  Not only did it
involve cleaning up the border but it also embraced private sector initiative and the
modernization of traditional microenterprises, two hallmarks of the administration's ambitious
economic reforms.46  As an established NGO, FEMAP was excellently placed to take
advantage of this commonality of interests.  The Brickmakers' Project also complemented
American efforts to defuse environmental opposition to NAFTA.47
Mexican Federal Support
In 1991 FEMAP was able to obtain an 800,000 peso trust fund for the Project directly
from the office of President Salinas through Solidarity Enterprises (Empresas Solidaridad), the
microenterprise development branch of the urban development program PRONASOL.48
                                               
43 Mumme, supra note 33, at 27. On the politicization of the environmental issue, see Steven Mumme &
Robert  Sanchez,  Mexico's Environment Under Salinas: Institutionalizing Reform, REV. OF LATIN AMERICAN
STUDIES (1990) at 44, 81.
44 Also, in November of 1991, with an $88 million World Bank loan, Mexico set in motion a plan to decentralize
and reform its environmental regulation; the states were encouraged to pass and enforce their own environmental
legislation subject to a Federal floor established by the 1988 Ecology Act. Kublicki, supra note 34, at 84.
45 On stricter enforcement see Bryan W. Husted & Jeanne M. Logsdon, The Impact of NAFTA on Mexico's
Environmental Policy, 28 GROWTH AND CHANGE 24. For a description EPA sponsored border environmental
activities see, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 160-B-95-001, COMPENDIUM OF EPA
BINATIONAL AND DOMESTIC US/MEXICO ACTIVITIES (1995).
46 For a discussion of Mexico's economic reform initiative see NORA LUSTIG, MEXICO: THE REMAKING OF AN
ECONOMY (1992); PEDRO ASPE ARMELLA, ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION THE MEXICAN WAY (1993).
47 Carol Browner, Director of the US Environmental Protection Agency, visited a FEMAP demonstration site
in March 1993. FEMAP, supra note 24.
48 FEMAP, supra note 24. PRONASOL (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad) was a program initially
administered within the office of the Presidency that offered matching funds to poor urban communities for the
installation of sewers, electricity and other basic infrastructure.  In April of 1992 PRONASOL was merged with
the environmental agency (SEDUE) to create SEDESOL, a cabinet-level ministry.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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This 800,000 peso fund was then used to leverage an 8,000,000 peso line of credit from
NAFIN, the Mexican Federal development bank that finances small business projects.  All of
these moneys were earmarked for the exclusive use of brickmakers.49  Thanks to this high
level of support, the Project was well-launched by 1994, the last year of the Salinas
administration.50
Participation in the Brickmakers' Project
One of the most noteworthy achievements of the Brickmakers' Project has been to
construct a broad base of institutional support that cuts across national and sectoral
boundaries.  A 1994 FEMAP report lists as participants twelve Mexican private sector
institutions, seven Mexican public sector institutions, and five American institutions.51  The
key Mexican private sector participants (aside from FEMAP and the brickmakers) were the
                                               
49 FEMAP, general brochure, supra note 14. Interview with Enrique Suárez, supra note 35.
50 The Salinas administration made quite a show of its support for the Brickmakers' Project.  Luis Donaldo
Colosio, then head of SEDESOL, and later the PRI's presidential candidate, delivered the first installment of
his agency's funds personally.  Salinas himself appeared with FEMAP officials in Ciudad Juárez on three
separate occasions in February 1993, August 1993, and in October of 1994. Carlos Irigoyen, Anuncian Plan
Ecologico, DIARIO DE JUÁREZ, February 13, 1992; FEMAP, supra note 24; Compromiso Ecologico es Moral,
no Politico: CSG, DIARIO DE JUÁREZ, August 6, 1993, FEMAP, ECO-TEC Report for October 1994-March
1995, (1995).
51 The Mexican private sector participants were: FEMAP, Associación Gilberto (a Mexican charitable
organization), Grupo Peñoles (a large Mexican mining conglomerate), Ciudad Juárez propane companies,
CONCANACO (a national federation of chambers of commerce), CANACINTRA (a national federation of
manufacturing industries), COPARMEX (a federation of big business owners), Economic Development of
Ciudad Juárez (a local businessmen's organization), Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de
Monterrey ("Monterrey Tech.") Ciudad Juárez Campus, construction companies in Ciudad Juárez, and the
brickmakers.  The Mexican public sector participants were:  SECOFI (the Federal Ministry of Commerce and
Industry), NAFIN (a Federal economic development bank), SEDESOL (the federal environmental agency from
1992 to 1995), Municipal and State Governments, Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juárez, INFONAVIT (the
Federal workers' housing agency), and Solidarity Enterprises (the Federal microenterprise development
program).  The American participants were:  El Paso Natural Gas Co., Los Alamos National Laboratory, the
Gas Research Institute (Chicago, IL), the University of Texas at El Paso, and the Southwest Center for
Environmental Research and Policy (SCERP) (a USEPA funded consortium of United States and Mexican
universities focusing on US-Mexican border environmental issues).
Of these organizations, several played relatively minor roles and are not discussed in the text.  The national
and local business federations served as bridges between the brickmakers, the construction and propane
companies, the municipal government, and the Project organizers.  Grupo Peñoles contributed engineering
expertise in early efforts to improve kiln efficiency.  The Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juárez conducted a
study of brickmakers.  The state government of Chihuahua furnished political support.  Personnel from
Monterrey Tech. helped to develop training courses for brickmakers. American universities, funded by SCERP,
helped to develop brickmaker training courses, and conducted research on methods of improving kiln fuel
efficiency.  (Interview with Carlos Rincon, supra note 36.  Interview with Enrique Suárez, supra note 35;
Ordenan a INFONAVIT Utilizar Ladrillo Ecologico, DIARIO DE JUÁREZ, August 5, 1993; FEMAP, supra note
14; for a description of EPA funded activities see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 45.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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local propane companies which provided credit, training, and propane equipment.  The key
public sector participants were NAFIN and Solidarity Enterprises which provided funding, and
the municipal government which enforced a prohibition on the burning of dirty fuels.  The key
American participants were El Paso Natural Gas and Los Alamos National Laboratory which
provided engineering expertise and funding.  The next section discusses the contributions of
the Project participants in more detail.
Although the hard work of Project organizers was instrumental in securing the
participation of a diverse group of stakeholders, this work was facilitated by a number of factors
including:  FEMAP's strong community, business and political ties, the publicity created by
NAFTA, a palpable bandwagon effect, and a commonality of interests between the Project and
the various organizations involved.52  For example, on the last point, Los Alamos National
Laboratory's participation buttressed efforts to reposition itself as a center of environmental
research and technology transfer to the private sector; El Paso Natural Gas' contributions to the
project generated favorable public relations; and the participation of American universities was
facilitated by the availability of significant funding for border environmental projects.  It bears
emphasis, however, that community spirit was an important motive as well.53
Strategies
In attempting to induce the brickmakers to switch to propane, project leaders and
participants were faced with five key obstacles.  First, adopting propane required brickmakers
to obtain and learn to use relatively expensive equipment.  Second, at the beginning of the
Project, regulatory and hortatory pressure to abate kiln emissions was for the most part
extremely weak.  Third, although the brickmakers themselves were most affected by kiln
emissions, most did not perceive them to be imminently harmful.  Fourth, the traditional brick
making industry and the construction industry that buys from it are intensely competitive.
Consequently, there was considerable pressure for individual brickmakers to cut costs by
burning dirty fuels and for individual construction firms to purchase the least expensive
building materials.  Finally, and most important, throughout the Project's life, the cost of
propane was higher than the cost of debris.  Moreover, this cost differential increased
significantly over time.  In the early 1990s PEMEX, Mexico's state run petroleum company,
began to gradually eliminate long-standing subsides on propane in conjunction with the Salinas
                                               
52 FEMAP enjoys strong ties to community, business, and political leaders, in part because its founder and
president, Guadalupe de la Vega, is a member of a prosperous Ciudad Juárez family with considerable holdings in
retailing and industry.  These ties were particularly helpful in securing the participation of the national business
federations.  (Telephone interview with Carlos Rincon supra note 36, and with Nancy Lowery, Program
Coordinator, Center for Environmental Resource Management, University of Texas at El Paso, December 5, 1995.)
53 Several of the project engineers from El Paso Natural Gas and Los Alamos National Laboratory often
worked nights and weekends without remuneration in difficult conditions (See, e.g., Jeryl Z. Marcus, The
Brickmakers Story, PIPELINER, February 1994, at 21). This was certainly also true of FEMAP personnel, many
of whom volunteered their time.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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administration's economic liberalization program and to dampen a black market for subsidized
Mexican propane on the border (Chart 1).  At the beginning of 1992, per brick energy costs for
propane were twenty-nine percent higher than for scrapwood.  By July 1995, this differential
had risen to 162 percent.54
Participants in the Brickmakers' Project have promoted a broad range of initiatives designed
to overcome each of these barriers including:  the donation of propane equipment, setting up
technical extension services, disseminating information on the health impacts of burning debris,
formal and informal regulation, technological innovation, and market intervention.
Chart 1.
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54 At the beginning of 1992, propane prices were approximately 0.24 pesos per liter.  For the average
brickmaker this implied a cost of 37.02 pesos per 1000 bricks fired with propane versus 29.77 pesos per 1000
bricks fired with scrapwood.  By July 1995, the price of propane had risen to 0.71 pesos per liter, implying a
cost of 109.52 pesos per 1000 bricks fired with propane versus 41.78 pesos per 1000 bricks fired with
scrapwood. Propane prices were provided by FEMAP. Estimates of the per brick energy costs are based on
authors' survey data, supra note 30.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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Propane Equipment
The Brickmakers' Project was quite successful in creating access to propane equipment.
In our sample of fifty-nine propane users, propane companies in Ciudad Juárez provided free
equipment in every case (Table 1, page 6 above).  Of the thirty-six brickmakers interviewed
who never used propane, none said that a key reason was that the required equipment had not
been available or affordable.
Technical Extension
A number of organizations and individuals have provided training in the use of propane
including:  Ciudad Juárez propane companies (who seem to have taken the lead early on),
FEMAP, El Paso Natural Gas, and extension agents from both Monterrey Tech., and the Ciudad
Juárez campus.  FEMAP has attempted to institutionalize its extension services by establishing
"ECO-TEC," a center devoted to applied research on brickmaking and to training brickmakers in
management and the use of clean technologies.55  Although today ECO-TEC plays a key role in
FEMAP's brickmaker program, it did not begin operations until 1994, after the adoption of
propane in Ciudad Juárez had already been derailed by increases in propane prices.
It is not clear from our survey how important other sources of technical extension were
in facilitating the adoption of propane.  On one hand, sixty-eight percent of brickmakers who
used propane cited the "provision of information" as having played some role their decision to
adopt and nine percent cited it as the key reason (Table 2).  On the other hand, ninety percent
of all respondents claimed that no "technical assistance" was available to them (Table 1).
Table 2.  Seven Factors Affecting Adoption:
Percentage of adopters identifying each as "most important"
Factor Percent
Outside pressure 25
Good for environment 25
Access to free LPG equipment 21
Info. provided by city, et al. 9
LPG is more convenient 8




                                               
55 The center includes office space, classrooms, dormitories, and experimental kilns.  Envisioned as a national
center of brickmaking training and research, it was built in the summer and fall of 1993 using land donated by
the city government and funds obtained from Solidarity Enterprises, El Paso Natural Gas, and the FEMAP
Foundation, a fundraising arm of FEMAP based in El Paso. Instituto de Investigaciones Ecotecnologicas
FEMAP Report for December 1993-August 1994 3, 4 (1994). Interview with Enrique Suárez, supra note 35.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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Regulatory Pressure
Project participants have been intermittently successful at promoting propane use by
ratcheting up formal and informal penalties associated with the burning of debris.  Prior to
1992, burning debris was more or less tolerated by Municipal authorities.56  This tolerance
began to evaporate when Ciudad Juárez elected a new Municipal President, Francisco
Villarreal, in November 1991.  Partly as a result of the political climate discussed above,
Villarreal and the director of his ecology office, Francisco Nuñez, orchestrated a crackdown on
brick kiln emissions.  The use of "dirty" fuel to fire brick kilns was banned, though, as
explained in the next section, the definition of what constituted "dirty fuel" changed over
time.57  A peer monitoring mechanism was instituted to facilitate enforcement:  citizens were
encouraged to call Nuñez's office with complaints about brick kiln emissions.  Nuñez's office
then dispatched an enforcement team which routinely jailed violators for twenty-four to thirty-
six hours and sometimes fined them as well.  For several months in late 1992 and 1993,
propane was the only permissible clean fuel.  (Although enforcement during this period was
relatively vigorous, it was never universally effective.  A significant number of brickmakers, at
least thirty percent, continued to burn debris throughout the strict enforcement regime.)58
FEMAP administrators were supportive of this crackdown.59
Informal regulation, actively encouraged by project organizers, also influenced
brickmakers' production decisions.  Both FEMAP and the city authorities worked intensively
with leaders of the local brickmakers' organizations to encourage propane use.  In March of
1993, the leaders of all of the brickmakers' organizations were brought together to hammer out
an agreement on permissible fuels and to set a deadline for the switch to such fuels.60  Some of
the brickmaker organizations were quite cooperative, especially those with close relationships to
the political establishment.  As discussed above, politics and patronage played an important
                                               
56 Anders T. Johnson, supra note 8, at 3. Interview with Carlos Rincon, Project Director, Environmental
Defense Fund , in Cd. Juárez, Mex. (July 21, 1995); Telephone Interview with Carlos Rincon, supra note 36.
57 Juan Manuel Cruz, Proyectan Constitución de Cooperativas los Productores de Ladrilleros, NORTE DE
CIUDAD JUÁREZ, Feb. 8, 1993.
58 Most of the holdouts were brickmakers living in the relatively isolated colonia of Anapra and those affiliated
with the CDP.  BLACKMAN & BANNISTER, supra note 28; Materials Required to Manufacture Brick and Juárez Kiln
Distribution, Dirección Municipal de Ecologia de Ciudad Juárez, supra note 22.
59 Recently this regulatory scheme has been dismantled. Beginning in 1995, PROFEPA, the Federal Attorney
General's Office for Environmental Protection (created in 1992) assumed primary responsibility for
enforcement along the US-Mexican border. Federal authorities had technically assumed responsibility for point
sources of emissions within 100 kilometers of the US border under the terms of the 1983 US-Mexico Border
Environmental Agreement known as the La Paz Agreement. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 160-
K-94-001, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER 3 (1994). In practice, however,
Federal participation in day to day enforcement efforts -- at least with regard to brick kilns in Ciudad Juárez --
was limited until 1995. The regulation of brick kiln emissions has slackened relative to the Villarreal regime
Interviews with Carlos Rincon, supra notes 36, 56.
60 FEMAP, 1994, supra note 24 at 12.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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role.  Moreover, local organizations in some colonias enforced strict rules on permissible fuels,
no doubt motivated in part by a desire not to be undercut by neighbors using cheap fuel
(Table 1).  Other organizations like the CDP actively opposed the push for propane use.61
Our survey results suggest that formal and informal regulation played an important role
in brickmakers' adoption decisions, though it is not clear which was more influential.  A quarter
of brickmakers who adopted propane cited "outside pressure" as the key reason (Table 2).
Over three quarters were aware of government regulations regarding fuel choice and, of these,
the majority has seen the regulations enforced.  Over half of the brickmakers reported that
local organizations influenced their fuel choices, and over a third said that neighbors, as distinct
from local organizations, had an influence.
Education
FEMAP used one-on-one discussions with individual brickmakers and organized
training sessions to educate brickmakers about the harmful effects of burning dirty fuels.62
Judging from our survey results, these efforts have not had a great impact.  Only about one in
ten brickmakers in our sample associated any adverse health effects with brickmaking and even
more surprisingly, only about one in ten believed that firing with propane was "healthier" than
firing with debris (Table 1).  In fact, twenty-six of the ninety-five brickmakers surveyed
believed that dangerous fumes were emitted when kilns were fired with propane.63
Market Intervention
Project leaders pursued two strategies to reduce competitive pressures to burn cheap
dirty fuels.  First, in March of 1993, they helped to negotiate an agreement among leaders of all
of the major brickmakers unions, including those that opposed the propane program, to fix the
price of bricks at 250 pesos per thousand.64  The price floor was meant to be high enough to
allow all brickmakers to afford propane.  Predictably, however, many of the brickmakers who
were still burning debris began to cheat, selling at prices below the agreed upon floor, and the
agreement soon collapsed.  Second, Project leaders tried to organize a boycott of bricks fired
with debris and brick substitutes such as cinderblock.  In 1993, FEMAP and the city
                                               
61 BLACKMAN & BANNISTER, supra note 28.
62 In addition, an effort was made to reach a broader audience by producing and distributing a comic book on
health issues, a project funded jointly by El Paso Natural Gas and the Southwest Center for Environmental
Research and Policy.  Unfortunately, by the time this comic book was ready for distribution in January 1995,
the conversion effort had already been derailed by a rise in propane prices.
63 Rumors to this effect were spread by brickmakers opposed to the adoption of propane. Nevertheless, these
rumors may have some basis in fact since leaking propane lines and improperly adjusted tanks and burners can
emit noxious fumes. In 1995 two brickmakers who used propane died. While it is far from clear that propane
actually had anything to do with these deaths -- the official causes were cirrhosis and a heart attack -- persistent
rumors to this effect reflect a prejudice that is not uncommon among the brickmakers.
64 FEMAP, supra note 24 at 12.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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government were able to get construction companies to agree to participate, and in August of
1994, the Federal Government ordered INFONAVIT (the federal Workers' Housing Agency) to
participate as well.65  Unfortunately, neither INFONAVIT nor the construction companies
consistently complied with their agreements, and the arrangement floundered.
Technological Change
Project participants devoted a great deal of effort to attempting to lower the variable
costs of using propane by improving kiln fuel efficiency.  Engineers from El Paso Natural Gas,
Los Alamos National Laboratories and, to a lesser extent, Grupo Peñoles and the Gas Research
Institute in Chicago have been involved.  Many of the early experimental kilns required radical
departures from traditional kilns, such as:  (1) an electric heat source and conveyor belt,
(2) multiple propane burners inserted into the sides of the kiln, and (3) a multi-chambered kiln.66
More recent prototypes use a traditional kiln complete with arches and a sunken firebox as a
starting point.67
Engineers have also worked to improve fuel efficiency at low cost by modifying burners,
the fuel mixture, the manner in which bricks are stacked, the way that the kiln opening is
covered, and the way the bricks are dried prior to firing.  Fifty-four percent of the adopters in
our sample modified their kilns when they began to use propane (Table 1), but in two thirds of
the cases the modifications consisted of rebuilding arches or strengthening walls to enable them
to better withstand more intense heat generated by propane; energy savings was not a
consideration.  Thus, though the Project did succeed in introducing technologies such as
improved burners, and though it did persuade a great many brickmakers to change age-old
production methods (both significant achievements in themselves), as of current writing, it had
not yet developed and diffused affordable and low-technology innovations that significantly
reduce the variable costs of using propane by improving fuel efficiency.
Peak and Decline of the Brickmakers' Project
The high-water mark of the Brickmakers' Project, as measured by the percent of
brickmakers using propane, probably occurred in the fall of 1993.  Estimates of the percent of
brickmakers using propane at this time vary.  In our sample, which probably contains a
disproportionate number of adopters, sixty-two percent claimed to have used propane.68
                                               
65 Interview with Enrique Suárez, supra note 35.
66 FEMAP supra note 55. Los Alamos National Laboratories, Mexican Brick Kiln Study, March 18-20, Report
LAUR-94-1322, (1994); and Johnson, et al., supra note 8.
67 FEMAP ECO-TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Report for October 1994 - March 1995 (1995).
68 Our sample is probably biased towards propane users because we did not interview brickmakers in two distant
isolated colonias -- Anapra, and Fronteriza Baja -- where, by all accounts, few if any brickmakers ever used
propane. A 1994 FEMAP report states that as of April 1993, six months prior to the presumed high-water mark,
55 percent of brickmakers were using propane. FEMAP, supra note 55.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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By the fall of 1993, the pressures created by rising price of propane became severe.
Brickmakers began abandoning propane in droves.  Other key participants in the Brickmakers'
Project also began to defect.  The most important defection was the municipal government
which in late 1993, in the face of mounting opposition to the ban on burning debris, changed
its official policy to sanction the burning of sawdust untainted by resins or varnishes.  This had
the effect of removing the principal "stick" in the propane initiative, leaving only the "carrots"
such as subsidies and patronage.  Brickmaker unions and neighborhood organizations
increasingly dropped out as they were undercut by operators using dirty fuels.  As noted
above, construction companies and the Federal workers housing agency, which had agreed to
boycott dirty bricks, also reneged.  By July 1995, to our knowledge, only one brickmaker in
Ciudad Juárez was still using propane.
Though the brickmakers have abandoned propane, they have not reverted to burning
the dirtiest fuels such as tires, used motor oil, and plastic containers.  Only one of our ninety-
five survey respondents was still using tires in July 1995, and only one was using used motor
oil.  Both were combining these fuels with sawdust.  Twenty nine percent were using sawdust
exclusively, eighteen percent scrap wood exclusively, and the remaining fifty-three percent,
some combination of the two.69
The Project's success in reducing brickmakers' use of the dirtiest fuels was a result of
the continued application of both formal and informal regulatory pressure after the propane
initiative collapsed.  On the formal side, after the municipal government relaxed pressure on
brickmakers to adopt propane, it continued to discourage the use of fuels other than
sawdust.70  After de facto regulatory control passed to the Federal Government in 1995, a
country-wide prohibition on the uncontrolled burning of battery cases, tires, and used motor oil
came into effect.71  On the informal side, after moving away from propane, many of local
organizations continued to enforce bans on burning the dirtiest fuels.72
                                               
69 Our survey may underestimate the number of brickmakers who were burning dirty fuels for two reasons.  First,
survey respondents may have been unwilling to admit to using these fuels.  And second, our survey excluded
brickmakers in the remote colonia of Anapra where the primary fuel is reputed to be tires.  However, the extent of
the bias in our survey is probably not great.  Our enumerators observed very little evidence of the use of tires or
plastics in the brickyards.  Also, according to the city government, fewer than 4 percent of all the kilns in Ciudad
Juárez are located in Anapara.  Dirección Municipal de Ecologia de Ciudad Juárez, supra note 22.
70 Telephone interview with Carlos Rincon, supra note 36; Blackman & Bannister survey, supra note 30.
71 "These materials were declared hazardous wastes requiring special disposal in the Official Mexican Norm
NOM-052-ECOL-1993, establishing the characteristics of hazardous wastes, the listing thereof and the limits
that render a waste hazardous due to its environmental toxicity."  DIARIO OFICIAL (Official Mexican Gazette)
on October 22, 1993. For the full text of this norm see STP TECHNICAL PUBLISHERS, 1997. MEXICO:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND NORMS. NORTH VANCOUVER, BC, CANADA. D3-1 through -D3-30.
72 Interview with Carlos Rincon, supra note 56; authors' survey, supra note 30.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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Looking Ahead
Despite the failure of the propane initiative, FEMAP continues to work on promising
solutions to the brick kiln pollution problem.  Today, for all intents and purposes, FEMAP has
given up on trying to convince the Ciudad Juárez brickmakers to use propane.  It is now
promoting natural gas which burns as cleanly as propane but is far less expensive.
There are significant obstacles to the use of natural gas, however. Most important,
considerable permanent infrastructure is required.73  Whereas propane can be delivered and
stored in portable tanks, natural gas must be piped directly to kilns.  Also, expensive
decompressors are needed at pipeline junctions.  There are no natural gas pipelines in any of
the brickmaking colonias, although some pipelines are located nearby.  FEMAP estimates that
it would cost $800,000 to $1,000,000 to install all of the necessary infrastructure, and is
currently helping to solicit funds from a variety of sources.74,
FEMAP has also been seeking to help brickmakers diversify into higher value products
such as "Saltillo tile" and roof tile and to break into the US market for these goods.  FEMAP
hopes that a higher sales price will enable the brickmakers to afford clean fuels.75
Engineers at El Paso Natural Gas, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the University of
Utah continue to push ahead with efforts to engineer more fuel efficient kilns.  At the University
of Texas at El Paso a project is underway to design solar kilns that would, in effect, par-cook
bricks before they are fired, thereby reducing the time that the kiln needs to be fired.76
As for the brickmakers themselves, the failure of the propane initiative has left some cynical
and disaffected.  This is not surprising given that some brickmakers incurred significant costs in
time as well as money in switching to propane and then back to debris.  Predictably, the failure of
the initiative has provided grist for the local organizations that have opposed it all along.
4.   LESSONS  FOR POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR
The Brickmakers' Project holds at least four lessons for pollution control in the
informal sector.  These concern:  the promise of grass roots private-sector-led initiatives;
effective strategies for pollution control; first- vs. second-best abatement strategies; and the
fragility of voluntary market-based environmental initiatives.
                                               
73 In addition to the infrastructure problem, Project administrators attempting to engineer a switch to propane
will face many of the same obstacles that stymied the switch to propane, namely, weak regulatory pressure,
intensely competitive input and output markets, and the availability a lower cost dirty fuel.
74 Telephone Interview with Francisco Alfaro Mata, Director of ECO-TEC (April 24, 1995). Having conducted
tests in several colonias FEMAP plans to use Federal moneys remaining in the trust fund it administers to
subsidize the adaptation of traditional kilns to natural gas.
75 Interview with Franscisco Alfaro Mata, supra note 74; Interview with Carlos Rincon, supra note 56.
76 For a description, see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 45.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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The Promise of Grass-roots Private-sector-led Initiatives
In several respects, the Brickmakers' Project is a success story.  It has attracted a
remarkable amount of publicity and support.  Though the diffusion of propane among the
brickmakers was limited and temporary, it nevertheless represents a significant achievement in
view of the obstacles involved, especially the reduction in propane subsidies, without which
propane use probably would have continued to grow.  Thus, the Project illustrates that private-
sector-led initiatives hold considerable promise as a means of addressing informal sector
pollution problems.  They would seem to enjoy a number of advantages over state-run
programs.  Most importantly, the willingness of the majority of the brickmakers to cooperate
with the project suggests that private-sector-led initiatives may be best suited to engage firms
that by their nature are bound to be wary of sustained contact with regulatory authorities.
Also, the enthusiasm that the Project generated among funders, participants, and the public at
large suggests that grass roots private-sector-led projects may be able to draw more freely on
public sympathy for environmentalism than top-down bureaucratic initiatives.
The qualified success of the Brickmakers' Project, however, does not imply that
informal sector environmental problems are best left to private sector grassroots organizers.
In all likelihood, the Brickmakers' Project would not have had as much success without
unusually strong United States and Mexican Federal support, the support of the municipal and
state governments, and the leadership of a well-established politically savvy non-governmental
organization.
As discussed above, United States and Mexican Federal support for the border
environment largely grew out of the NAFTA fight coupled with the emergence of
environmentalism as a Mexican electoral issue.  It took the form of funding, publicity, and
pressure applied to state and municipal governments.  FEMAP might not have been able to
initiate or sustain a high level of effort without Federal support.  The same might be said of
other participants in the Project including the University of Texas at El Paso, Monterrey Tech.,
El Paso Natural Gas, and Los Alamos National Laboratory.  Federal support aside, it is doubtful
that the Project could have made as much progress in diffusing propane without the willingness
of the Ciudad Juárez Municipal government to crack down on the burning of debris.
Finally, FEMAP is not a typical grassroots organization.  It enjoys strong political and
business ties that have helped to attract Federal support, convince other institutions to
participate, elicit the cooperation of local governments, and generate publicity.  A less well-
established and well-connected organization would have had much more difficulty organizing
such an effort.
Thus, the first lesson of the Brickmakers' Project is that private sector led initiatives can
work -- indeed they may be more effective than public sector initiatives -- but they require strong
public sector support and some ability on the part of project organizers to leverage this support.Blackman and Bannister RFF 98-15
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Effective Strategies for Pollution Control in the Informal Sector
As noted above, environmental management in the informal sector is inherently difficult
for a number of reasons.  The number, size, dispersion and anonymity of informal firms make
them exceedingly difficult to monitor.  Intense competition biases them towards least-cost
inputs.  And poverty in the informal sector weakens political will to impose stiff compliance
costs.  Despite these obstacles, the Brickmakers' Project was, for a time, successful in inducing
brickmakers in Ciudad Juárez to adopt a clean technology that in most cases raised production
costs.  What organizational strategies were responsible?
First, Project organizers encouraged a cooperative relationship with the brickmakers,
not the adversarial relationship that exists between most regulators and polluters.  Instead of
focusing solely on punishing non-adopters, Project organizers sought to reward adopters by
providing equipment, credit, technical extension, subsidies, and less visible patronage.  Just as
important, they worked to develop good relationships with brickmakers both individually and
as represented by various organizations.  This cooperative approach was effectively built into
the Project from the beginning.  FEMAP is a social service organization and envisioned the
Project as a means of improving the lives of the brickmakers as well as of reducing air
pollution. Indeed, some of the Project's activities, such as management training, and the recent
effort to diversify brickmakers' products have been primarily oriented towards economic
development, not environmental management.  Also, as a non-governmental organization with
no enforcement powers, FEMAP had little choice but to adopt a cooperative approach.
FEMAP's cooperative approach helped to defuse opposition to stiff enforcement
measures.  FEMAP encouraged both formal and informal enforcement.  It supported the
municipal government's crackdown on nonadopters.  The municipal government strengthened
enforcement by setting up a peer monitoring system wherein city authorities responded to
citizen complaints.  Project organizers also encouraged informal enforcement by labor unions
and neighborhood associations.  This may have been an increasingly easy task as adopters had
an incentive to ensure that their neighboring competitors switched to propane as well.77  One
must note, however, that the success of the Brickmakers' Project in promoting both formal and
informal enforcement depended largely on the fact that neighbors could observe violations
because they could see or smell toxic smoke.  Other types of informal sector pollution, such as
the dumping of waste oil into sewers by mechanics, would not be so easily detected.
While providing inducements and promoting enforcement seem to have succeeded in
convincing brickmakers to adopt propane, efforts to introduce energy-efficient kilns, educate
the brickmakers regarding private health and safety issues, and to manipulate the market for
bricks were less successful, either because they were poorly implemented or simply ill-
conceived.  The Projects' inability to design and diffuse innovations that significantly improved
kiln fuel-efficiency seems mainly due to the difficulty of the task, but is at least partly
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attributable to a failure to have embraced two well-established principals for introducing new
technologies in low income settings.  First, to the extent possible, intended adopters should
participate in designing and building the innovation.  And second, new technologies must be
"appropriate", that is both affordable and consistent with existing levels of technology.78  By
contrast, most of the early experimental kilns were designed by highly trained engineers, and
involved radical departures from existing kilns.
Our survey results also suggest that the Brickmakers' Project may have missed an
opportunity to promote the adoption of propane by educating brickmakers about the private
health benefits of burning propane instead of debris and/or the importance of the proper use of
propane.  As mentioned above, few respondents perceived burning propane to be "healthier"
than burning debris.
It is clear that all of the Project organizers 's attempts to manipulate the market for
bricks -- by fixing the price of bricks in March of 1993, and, later that same year, organizing a
boycott of bricks produced using dirty fuels -- failed utterly.  In most cases, contravening
market forces in developing countries simply does not work; monitoring is too difficult and
cheating is too easy, especially in the informal sector.79
To conclude, the Brickmakers' Project suggests four lessons for environmental
management in the informal sector.  First, effective environmental management requires
establishing a cooperative instead of an adversarial relationship with firms, one based on
recognizing the socio-economic needs of those who depend on informal sector activities.
Beyond rhetoric, establishing such a relationship entails encouraging the participation of local
unions and political organizations and, even more concretely, providing a variety of inducements
to offset the costs involved in producing more cleanly, including subsidies on new inputs, credit,
and technical extension.  Second, environmental regulations can be enforced in the informal
sector by relying on peer monitoring and on informal regulation as well as formal regulation.
Third, new clean technologies must be appropriate, that is, both affordable and low technology.
Finally, attempts to manipulate informal markets simply do not work.
Second-best Strategies
The contrast between the collapse of the propane initiative and the success of efforts to
reduce the use of the particularly dirty fuels like used tires and plastics suggests that, in
retrospect, it might have been a better strategy to promote conversion to relatively clean
traditional fuels like untainted sawdust than to push for the adoption of propane.  The broad
lesson is that in the informal sector where firms operate on slim profit margins and where the
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costs of implementing any pollution control strategy are likely to be high, it is critical that
policy makers weigh the costs of various strategies against the benefits.  In some cases, the
strategies that provide the greatest environmental benefits may be less appropriate than
intermediate strategies that confer fewer benefits at lower cost.  Just as certain first-best
technologies may be inappropriate in the informal sector, certain first-best pollution control
strategies may also be inappropriate.  This lesson has direct implications for other Mexican
cities where emissions from informal brick kilns are a serious problem.
The Fragility of Voluntary Market Based Environmental Initiatives in the Informal Sector
Ultimately FEMAP's propane program was undermined by steady reductions in subsidies
to propane on the United States-Mexican border.  Does the program's demise hold any lessons?
On one hand, this history might be seen as evidence of a failure on the part of the Mexican
government to coordinate conflicting policy initiatives.  While the Federal government actively
supported and funded the effort to convert brickmakers to propane, it simultaneously supported
the liberalization program that undermined it.80  But this liberalization program was part of a
broad economic reform.  The economic benefits of this reform may well have outweighed the
costs, including the environmental costs.  To reduce these environmental costs, the Mexican
government might have subsidized propane use by key low income users who were bound to
substitute into dirty fuels.  But such a policy would have been difficult to implement and likely to
perpetuate the black market in subsidized propane.
It seems equally unfair to fault the organizers of the Brickmakers' Project.  Propane
prices only began to increase in 1992.  By this time, an initial group of the brickmakers in
Ciudad Juárez had already switched to propane and the Project had completely organized itself
around the strategy of engineering a switch.  Also, project organizers are now promoting an
alternative strategy -- the adoption of natural gas.
Thus, the overarching lesson to be learned from the demise of the propane initiative is
somewhat bracing: in volatile developing economies, voluntary market based environmental
initiatives among informal sector firms are bound to be fragile, even when well-designed and
well-implemented.
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